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Abstract
In this paper, we aim to empirically analyze the determinants of firm entry and exit 
in Russia using a regional-level panel data for the years of 2008–2014, with special 
emphasis on institutional failures and the politico-economic impact of external crises. 
We found that these two elements exhibit statistically significant and economically 
meaningful effects both on the creation and destruction of Russian firms, controlling 
for potentially explanatory factors. Our empirical results also suggest that the process 
of firm entry and exit is manifold across Russian regions due to their heterogeneity. 
Nevertheless, a surprisingly robust estimate of the world oil price (irrespective of 
the difference in target regions) suggests a possible high exposure of each Russian 
region to a global crisis. This comes from the importance of oil trade with the world 
and, accordingly, the ongoing crisis may bring a harmful influence to regeneration of 
Russian businesses.
© 2016 Non-profit partnership “Voprosy Ekonomiki”. Hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights 
reserved.
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1. Introduction
One generation after the launch of the perestroika, two features characterize 
Russian business relative to many other transition countries: first, barriers to en-
try are considerably more pronounced and second, as a result, the extremely low 
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level of firm entry in Russia by international standards. The Amadeus dataset, 
which is restricted to firms with more than 50 employees, provides a record of 
formal entry and shows gross entry rates from 1999 at below one percent. Entry 
rates are significantly lower in Russia than in other former socialist economies, 
and even these are (negative) outliers by developed economy standards (Aidis 
and Estrin, 2006; Aidis and Adachi, 2007; Aidis et al., 2008). For comparison, in 
Brazil the gross entry rates are up to 14% and net entry rates in China and India 
of over 6% pa and 3–4% pa, respectively. The picture that emerges is a blessing 
curse, as growth is fueled by oil exports, while other economically important ar-
eas, such as small and medium enterprises (SMEs), are underdeveloped. 
The reinforcement of SMEs is key for the emergence of values and norms 
attached to the market economy. In terms of purely formal constraints, Russia 
performs relatively well; but enforcement is poor. The rule of law is also weak, 
creating uncertainty and non-consistency, which is damaging to the firms’ pro-
sperity. The absence of confidence in investing at home is reflected by the net 
private capital outflows, which stood in 2014 at $150 billion, equivalent to 8% of 
GDP. One of the main problems faced by Russian business owners is illegal prac-
tices such as bribing and corruption, as repetitively reflected in the Russian firms’ 
survey by the World Bank. The fatality of being involved in corruption activities 
constitutes the main pervasive and self-reinforcing entry barrier. 
The World Bank doing business indicators provide useful information for as-
sessing the quality of the business environment across a large set of countries: 
ease of doing business, starting a business (licenses), getting electricity, register-
ing property, getting credit, protecting minority investors, enforcing contracts, 
resolving insolvency. As reported by Doing Business, Russia ranks 13th out of 
25, its worst position being registered under the protection of minority investors, 
trading across borders, and dealing with construction permits items. Two out of 
those three indicators correspond to our research questions: Trading across bor-
ders records the time and cost associated with the logistical process of exporting 
and importing goods. More precisely, it measures the time and cost (excluding 
tariffs) associated with three sets of procedures — documentary compliance, bor-
der compliance and domestic transport — within the overall process of exporting 
or importing a shipment of goods. This indicator describes the logistical obsta-
cles towards a deeper integration of Russian enterprises into the world economy. 
Protection of minority rights measures the strength of minority shareholder’s 
protection against misuse of corporate assets by directors for their personal gain, 
as well as shareholder rights, governance safeguards and corporate transpar-
ency requirements that reduce the risk of abuse. One interesting component in 
the building of the protection of minority rights is the ease of shareholder suit 
index, which is one of our variables of interest. 
Another pernicious feature of the Russian economic performance over the re-
cent decades is the continuous fall of non-energy goods and services in total 
exports, echoing the weaknesses of SMEs in the manufacturing and service sec-
tors, while oil represents the lion’s share of total trade. In fact, in recent years, 
the concentration of Russia’s economy in the oil and gas sector has steadily in-
creased over time. In addition, Russia’s non-energy sector has become less com-
petitive in world markets. While the volume of the nation’s non-energy mer-
chandise exports grew at an annual rate of 11% in 2010, they grew by only 7.6% 
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in 2014.1 According to the UNCTAD, cumulative foreign direct investments 
(FDI) per capita over the period 1989–2014 were low up to 2008 as compared 
with similar countries (CEECs EU and non-EU) and from 2008 onwards dis-
played a relatively higher trend. In the first period they stand at $3558, respec-
tively $6562 for CEECs EU countries and $3658 for CEECs non-EU countries. 
Same data over the second more recent period (2008–2014) delivers a different 
picture, Russia having attracted $2443 of FDI per capita while CEECs EU coun-
tries and CEECs non-EU countries received $2534 and $2174 of FDI per capita, 
respectively. Needless to say, the top donor of inward FDI is the fuel and energy 
sector.2 Overall, Russia’s comparative advantage in the oil sector is reinforcing 
in the last decade. It corresponds to a double hypothesis, which our empirical 
analysis is focusing on: first the country’s sensitivity to the crisis passes essen-
tially to the evolution of the world market for oil. This has obvious repercus-
sions for Russian SMEs because the shocks in the oil market are spreading to 
the rest of the economy. In addition, Russian firms face the curse of the oil rent, 
which is amplified by the institutional weaknesses such as the low enforcement 
of property rights and corruption, as mentioned above. 
In this paper, we aim to analyze the determinants of firm entry and exit in 
Russia using a hand-crafted regional-level panel data for the years of 2008–2014, 
with a special emphasis on the institutional failures and the politico-economic 
impact of external crises. We found that these two elements exhibit statistically 
significant and economically meaningful effects both on the creation and de-
struction of Russian firms, while controlling for potentially explanatory factors. 
The robust estimate of the world oil price, irrespective of the difference in target 
regions, indicates that Russian regions are possibly sensitive to a global crisis 
whatever the circumstances. Accordingly, the ongoing crisis may bring a harmful 
influence to a regeneration of the Russian business. 
The study of firm’s birth and death in Russia is relatively scarce. Noticeable 
exceptions are Rinaldi (2008), Iwasaki (2014), and Sprenger (2014), who investi-
gated the firm-level determinants of survival. This paper complements their find-
ings by identifying the national and regional-level factors that significantly affect 
both the market entry and exit of Russian firms.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The next section reviews 
the literature about firms’ net entry and creative destruction, by focusing on tran-
sition countries. Section 3 presents statistical evidence on the entry and exit of 
Russian firms over the period 2008–2014. Section 4 conducts the empirical anal-
ysis while Section 5 interprets the empirical results and concludes the paper.
2. Literature review
The process of entry of new firms is an important element in the dynamics of 
market economies, as underlined by Caves (1998) and Bartelsman et al. (2004). 
New firm entry helps to transfer resources from low to high productivity activities 
 1 Authors’ calculation based on the official statistics of the Federal State Statistical Service of Russia (http://
www.gks.ru).
 2 UNCTAD database (http://unctadstat.unctad.org). See Iwasaki and Suganuma (2015a, 2015b) for details of 
the recent trend of international trade and FDI inflow in Russia.
165I. Iwasaki et al. / Russian Journal of Economics 2 (2016) 162−191
and underlies competitive pressures dissipating monopoly rents. When analyzing 
ways in which institutional change affects the performance of developing econo-
mies, North (1991) emphasized the role that the institutional environment plays in 
promoting entrepreneurial development and the impact of informal as well as for-
mal institutions, suggesting that entry barriers may be higher in developing coun-
tries where the general business environment is weaker. As a developing economy, 
Russia is indeed characterized by a complex system of entry barriers or entry fos-
tering mechanisms. The weakness of institutions enhances the market power of in-
cumbents (Djankov et al., 2002), with harmful implications for welfare (Banerjee 
and Ghatak, 2005). Following these ideas, the work of De Soto (1990) has sug-
gested that regulation of entry represents an important entry barrier in emerging 
markets. The literature has argued that regulation is introduced by policy makers 
in their own interests, namely the pursuit of their own remuneration (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1993). When analyzing how legal and institutional environments raise 
the cost of doing business, Friedman et al. (2000) found that the costs of enforcing 
contracts are associated with higher level of corruption. These additional costs bear 
more heavily on entrants than incumbents and poor institutional environments en-
hance the advantages to incumbents yielded by higher levels of regulation.
The empirical evidence on emerging markets strongly supports the predictions 
with respect to regulations, but the argument with regard to institutions has rarely 
been tested. Using data on regulations of entry in 85 countries, Djankov et al. 
(2002) find a positive relationship between the size of informal economy (in turn 
highly correlated with corruption), and the burden of the entry regulation mea-
sured by the number of procedures, time and cost of starting a firm. Similarly, 
Klapper et al. (2006) find that regulations hinder entry, notably those which are 
in naturally “high entry” industries. However, regulations are not always welfare 
reducing; labor regulations reduce entry into labor intensive sectors but property 
rights protection increases entry in R&D intensive sectors (Bertrand and Kramarz, 
2002). Ciccone and Papaionnaou (2007) show that entry rates are higher when 
the time for registering new businesses is lower, although this is also influenced 
by demand and technology factors.
In the specific case of Russia, Aidis and Adachi (2007) attempt to find out 
the reason for a relatively low number of new firms. Since the internationally 
comparative data do not provide an explanation for this situation, the authors 
conclude that the low degree of firm creation and the low survival rate of newly 
created businesses are due to informal impediments associated with the lack of 
rule of law, inconsistent enforcement of regulations, regional autonomy and per-
vasive corruption. These findings are consistent with the conclusions of the sur-
vey carried out by Estrin and Prevezer (2010) in a selected group of emerging 
economies. The survey displays widely varying entry and exit rates among 
the countries, which is due to different institutional settings. In the case of Russia, 
relatively good formal rules and structures are undermined by informal mecha-
nisms deterring or blocking business entry.
The exiting literature has also highlighted the weak institutional environment 
in Russia with respect to entrepreneurship (Aidis et al., 2008) with negative in-
formal values towards private business and lack of property rights enforcement 
(Puffer and McCarthy, 2001; Aidis and Adachi, 2007). Berkowitz and DeJong 
(2005) show that Russian regional entrepreneurial activity exhibits a statistically 
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and quantitatively significant relationship with subsequent growth. However, 
the regulatory stance that the Russian national and local governments take to-
ward business and the levels of corruption work to the detriment of private sector 
development (Frye and Shleifer, 1997). Given these specific institutional weak-
nesses, recent studies have highlighted different aspects concerning the diffu-
sion of new entrepreneurs in connection with institutions. For instance, Aidis 
et al. (2008) explore the impact of the entrepreneurial environment by comparing 
Russia with other economies. Their results suggest that the negative environment 
for business in Russia has led to low levels of entrepreneurship. The authors con-
clude that the weakness of Russian institutions is detrimental to entrepreneurial 
activity and although networks are important, they are not entirely able to off-
set these deficiencies. In parallel, Bruno et al. (2008), who analyze a three-year 
panel of Russian firms, conclude that the entry rates in Russia are correlated with 
institutions and firm size. A recent paper by Iwasaki (2014) confirms the key im-
portance of institutions, by providing strong evidence that the independence of 
governance bodies from top management is positively correlated with the sur-
vival probability of the firm. This result is in line with one key aspect in corporate 
governance research: outside shareholders and outsider board members feel freer 
to criticize the company management than employee shareholders and insider 
directors, who are more likely to support their company’s top executives. 
In this paper we also try to quantify the extent to which the 2008 financial 
shock and subsequent economic crisis affected the firm creation and destruction 
in Russia. The global turmoil impacted the emerging countries in different ways, 
depending on their previous growth patterns and forms of international integration 
(Drahokoupil and Myant, 2012). The initial shock in the United States spread over 
the rest of the world through a contagion/transmission mechanism which trans-
formed the initial sub-prime crisis into a global economic turmoil. Although being 
major beneficiaries of the economic boom before 2007, the emerging countries be-
came the first victims of the global crisis after 2008 (Dolphin and Chappell, 2010). 
This is because the world economy is much more integrated and interdependent to-
day than ten or twenty years ago, which implies a limited national economic sove-
reignty and consequently higher exposure of all countries to international macro-
economic fluctuations (Dabrowski, 2010). Gurtner (2010) considers that the crisis 
was transmitted primarily by trade and financial flows and the impact on emerging 
countries was higher in those that were highly integrated in the world economy.
Although Russia entered the crisis with a strong fiscal position, low public debt 
and large reserves (Bogetic et al., 2010,) the country experienced one of the sharp-
est declines of GDP. According to Blanchard et al. (2010), the first shock announc-
ing the crisis was related to the war in Georgia, which practically opened the trans-
mission channel to the economic turbulence. A severe decline in the stock market 
took place in August 2008, compounded by plummeting oil prices, which initiated 
a severe economic recession (Barannik, 2010). As a result, numerous weaknesses 
of Russia’s export-dependent economy in the money markets and in the financial 
sector started to evolve. The high impact of the crisis, in spite of very good fiscal 
situation, was due to three main factors (Ickes and Gaddy, 2010): high dependence 
of the economy on oil and gas, addiction to resources rents, and the specificity of 
“Protection Racket” system of political economy. These systemic problems have 
obstructed the complete recovery of the economy after the 2008 crisis.
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Further, in December 2014, Russia entered a new financial crisis which has ex-
posed the real scale of the economic problems that have been growing in the coun-
try for several years. The main macroeconomic indicators deteriorated consider-
ably, the confidence of its citizens in the state and in institutions in charge of 
economic stability declined, the government and business elites became increas-
ingly dissatisfied with the policy direction adopted by the Kremlin, and fighting 
started over the shrinking resources (Łabuszewska, 2015). It should be noted that 
in addition to the crisis aspect, the Russian economy has been equally affected by 
the EU-USA sanctions following the annexation of Crimea and further activities 
in Eastern Ukraine. Oxenstierna and Olsson (2015) conclude that the targeted 
economic sanctions have contributed to imposing a cost on the Russian economy. 
In the presence of a politicized economic system, this gave advantage in resource 
allocation to rent-addicted loss-making producers loyal to the regime over com-
petitive companies, which damaged the country’s economic performance. On top 
of those factors, the falling oil price on the world markets, coupled with the de-
preciation of the ruble, have weakened even more the terms of trade. 
Based on the above discussions, we conjecture that the firm entry rate into 
the market is impacted mainly through the evolution of the oil sector, a fact that is 
entirely compatible with the low integration of Russian SMEs in the world econo-
my. We also give great attention to the institutional failures that reinforce the curse 
of the oil sector, namely the poor efficiency of the judiciary system. The latter 
contributes to bail out inefficient firms and to reinforce barriers to entry and exit. 
3. Firm entry and exit in Russia: A statistical overview
In this section, we overlook the dynamics and trends of firm entry and exit in 
Russia overall and its regions during the period 2008–2014. The Federal State 
Statistics Service (Rosstat) discloses monthly rates of firm entry and exit all over 
the Russian Federation, and yearly rates for federal districts and constituent enti-
ties, which are displayed in Figs. 1 and 2, and in Table 1.
Panel (a) of Fig. 1 shows that, as argued in the previous section, firm entry rates 
in Russia are relatively low and depict a slight decreasing trend (from more than 
9 newly established companies per 1,000 existing firms to 8 per 1,000 between 
2008 and 2014). On the other hand, as shown in Panel (b) of the same figure, 
the number of liquidated companies per 1,000 firms is even lower, but exhibits 
a much stronger and significant increase (by about two points during the same 
period). In fact, a simple OLS regression of the firm entry and exit rates on a time 
trend variable shows that the monthly firm entry rate decreases by 0.0145 and 
the firm exit rate increases by 0.0673 at 5% and 1% level of statistical signifi-
cance, respectively.3
 3 The estimation results are the following:
Firm entry = 8.660***  – 0.0145** × Trend N = 84, R2 = 0.074, F = 5.28**
 (25.25) (–2.30)
Firm exit = 2.784*** + 0.0673*** × Trend N = 84, R2 = 0.551, F = 83.76***
 (12.44) (9.15)
  Figures in parentheses beneath regression coefficients are t-statistics computed based on robust standard 
errors. *** and ** denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. Null hypothesis of 
the F-test is that all coefficients are zero.
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Regarding the entry of new firms into the market, Panel (a) of Fig. 1 shows 
that the trend started to revert towards mid–2012 with a slight increasing ten-
dency in the beginning of the second semester of 2014. Over the whole period of 
observation the evolution of firm entry is rather chaotic, with successive peaks 
and bottoms; for example, in October 2008 the firm entry rate was 10.1% but in 
January 2009 it fell to 5.2%, and then again increased to 8.6% by March 2009. 
This erratic evolution can be observed during the whole time horizon 2008–2014, 
which shows a significant degree of instability in the economy coupled with high 
uncertainty related to legislation, political and institutional environment, and dis-
cretionary bureaucratic practices in granting new business licenses. On annual 
basis Panel (a) of Fig. 2 shows that the entry of Russian firms experienced a sig-
nificant decline from 115.2 per 1,000 firms in 2008 to 88.7 in 2009, remaining 
afterwards at practically the same level between 2009 and 2014.
With respect to the firm exit, Panel (b) of Fig. 1 shows a relatively constant in-
crease of the indicator until the beginning of 2011, followed by a highly volatile 
evolution afterwards. This can be attributed to the previous factors — uncertainty 
and instability — related to informal mechanisms deterring the net expansion of 
businesses. As a result, towards the end of 2014 the new entries are entirely an-
Fig. 1. Dynamics of firm entry and exit in Russia, 2008–2014.
Note: Firm entry and exit rate denote number of newly established and liquidated firms per 1,000 organizations, 
respectively.
Source: Russian Federal State Statistics Service (http://www.gks.ru).
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nulled by the number of firms quitting the market. On annual basis, as Panel (b) 
of Fig. 2 exhibits, the firm exit rate depicts a modest increase until 2010, then 
a sudden jump in 2011, followed by a declining trend in the last two years of 
the period. The high difference in the firm exit rates between 2010 and 2011 can 
be attributed to the world economic crisis, whose impact arrived with some time-
Fig. 2. Dynamics of firm entry and exit in Russian federal districts, 2008–2014.
Note: Firm entry and exit rate denote number of newly established and liquidated firms per 1,000 organizations, 
respectively.
Source: Russian Federal State Statistics Service (http://www.gks.ru).
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lag as compared to the entry rates, where the effect of the global turmoil took 
place immediately.
Fig. 2 also illustrates time-series changes of firm entry and exit rates at the lev-
el of federal districts. From this figure we can observe that there is a weak but 
negative trend in firm entry, while a notable increasing trend exists in the case 
of firm exit. In other words, as in the whole federation, Russian districts have 
experienced an accelerated decrease of turnover (number of firms created plus 
the number of firms that left the market) since January 2008, with a much more 
significant contribution of the firm exit. The declining trend of entries, coupled 
with an increasing tendency of exit rates, suggest an overall low survival rate of 
Russian companies on the market, as discussed in Aidis and Adachi (2007). 
Table 1 reports the rankings of Russian regions in terms of firm entry and exit 
rates in 2008 and 2014. This table suggests that the situation of each particular 
region changed substantially during the period. In fact, according to Panel (a) of 
Table 1, out of the first 10 regions ranked with respect to the firm entry rates in 
2008, only four are present in the top 10 six years later, in 2014 (Perm Territory, 
Sverdlovsk, Ivanovo and Nizhny Novgorod). The best performer of 2008 (Chechen 
Republic) is ranked only 46th in 2014. With few exceptions, we therefore cannot 
speak about constantly good performers. The business development in a particular 
region and in a specific period is probably subject to the political orientation of lo-
cal authorities; when local governments are politically consonant with the central 
power the region performs well.
Similarly, as indicated in Panel (b) of Table 1, out of the top 10 regions record-
ing the lowest firm exit rates in 2008 only three of them (Kaluga, Moscow region 
and Khanty-Mansi Area) are ranked in 2014 among the first ten best performers; 
the Moscow capital, for instance, lost 78 positions over the period, passing from 
an exit rate of 21.7 in 2008 to 120 six years later. At the same time, the Russian 
Federation contains regions where both firm entry and exit rates are high in 2014 
(Saint Petersburg: entry rate 112.7; exit rate 103), as well as regions where both 
indicators are low (Stavropol: entry rate 53.8; exit rate 35.3). The two catego-
ries of regions are relatively balanced and record overall a net rate of business 
creation. Nevertheless, there are certain regions where the entry rate is low and 
the exit rate high (Chukotka Area: entry rate 49.8; exit rate 86.5), which implies 
a net rate of firm destruction and consequently economic depression. There are 
only very few regions where high firm entry rates coexist with low exit rates, 
implying a good development potential: only one such region is found within 
the top 20 with respect to high entry, respectively low exit rates — Republic of 
Udmurtia: entry rate 103.2; exit rate 51.4.
In sum, the aforementioned findings suggest firstly that the market entry of 
Russian firms was discouraged by the global financial crisis, which started in 
September 2008 and lasted at the end of 2014, a period characterized by sub-
sequent economic downturns. Firms’ exit exhibited a strong upward trend and 
it is conceivable that this phenomenon was also triggered by the 2008 financial 
shock from the US and amplified by the following crises in Europe and Ukraine. 
Second, the above tendency was observed in all federal districts, suggesting that 
the recent crises have negatively influenced Russian firms and entrepreneurs 
whatever their geographical location and specialization. Third, the level and 
volatility of firms’ entry and exit rates vary greatly across Russian regions and 
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over time. This suggests that the impact of the crisis was different, depending 
on the vulnerability to the world crisis and the reliance on the oil sector, but, 
in a more discriminative way, on the differences in institutional and business 
environments.
4. Empirical analysis
In this section, we will empirically examine the determinants of firm entry and 
exit in Russia using a regional-level panel data for the period between 2008 and 
2014. Here, inspired by the arguments in the existing literature and the observa-
tions reported in the previous section, we intend to perform regression analy-
sis paying a special attention to two aspects: institutional failures and the recent 
politico-economic crises. More specifically, we will estimate a multivariate re-
gression equation, which takes a natural logarithm of firm entry or exit rate as 
a dependent variable and proxies for the regional-level institutional quality and 
the economic integration as independent variables, while controlling for other 
potentially explanatory factors. The next subsection gives a detailed explanation 
of independent variables used in our regression analysis. Subsection 4.2 reports 
estimation results, and Subsection 4.3 checks statistical robustness of the empiri-
cal evidence.
4.1. Selection of independent variables
To assess the impact of institutional failures on the creation and destruction 
of Russian firms, we employed four proxies for the efficiency of the judiciary 
system which are available at the regional level. They include: the mean and me-
dian duration of lawsuit at a regional arbitration court, the acceptance rate of 
petition by regional arbitration courts, and lawsuits application number to re-
gional arbitration courts per 1,000 organizations. As emphasized in Dmitrieva 
et al. (2012), the duration of a lawsuit at a regional arbitration is a key aspect, as 
it affects the functioning of a business activity. Slowness and poor performance 
of the judiciary system to resolve disputes relating to the non-compliance with 
contracts and the non-payment of arrears can jeopardize the business of SMEs. 
For the latter, delayed payments combined with a limited access to bank credit 
can result in the inability to continue their business. The Russian Federation is 
classified as a “high compliance country”, which refers to the level of compliance 
with international standards for corporate governance. The country is considered 
therefore as having a sound legal framework at a par with OECD ones (EBRD, 
2005). Official data on entry costs (like number of days for starting a business and 
contract enforcement) puts Russia as the best performer of the BRIC countries. 
The time needed to resolve overdue payments fell from 7 to 6 weeks between 
2002 and 2005. Formal barriers are relatively low. But the de facto reality is far 
from this de jure situation. Law enforcement is indeed arbitrary, with over 80% of 
Russian entrepreneurs suffering from broken contracts (Radaev, 2002). Johnson 
et al. (1999) indicate that relational contracting plays a significant role in Russia 
where the court system is inefficient, which is a strong obstacle to the normal 
development of SMEs. Overall, it seems that the legal and regulatory framework 
is blurred by numerous inconsistencies, with many Soviet regulations still in 
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force; “No one really knows which laws and regulations are implemented and ob-
served, although it is clear that many are not implemented at all, or only partially” 
(OECD, 2005, p. 5). These arguments suggest that the above four variables are 
likely to be negatively related to the net entry rate of Russian firms. We believe 
that, although these variables are cross-sectional due to information constrains, 
they reflect well the effectiveness of regional courts; not being derived formally 
from official definitions, they depict what really happens on the ground.
In addition to the above court-related variables, we will also utilize a criminal 
risk ranking evaluated by the Expert rating agency — a famous Russian think-tank, 
which is a regional-level time-variant variable, as an additional proxy for the in-
stitutional quality. According to the Transparency International, Russia has much 
worse levels of corruption than Brazil, China and India for 1998 — 2004, improv-
ing somewhat to converge with Indian levels in 2002. The Business Environment 
and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) reports a significant worsening in 
the perception of corruption between 2002 and 2005 as compared with transi-
tion countries, where the situation improved (EBRD, 2005). Corruption refers to 
the percentage of contract paid to secure a government contract, the percentage 
of respondents who agreed to pay irregular payments or gifts and losses due to 
crime as a share of sales, all of which appear to be significant in Russia. This 
corruption cannot be considered as being wheel-greasing, but it is rather linked 
to deficiencies in law enforcement, whereby legislation can be interpreted in dis-
cretionary ways by the authorities. Radaev (2002) finds that over 80% of Russian 
entrepreneurs had suffered from broken contracts. Guriev and Rachinsky (2004) 
argue that while industrial concentration has increased, the influence of incum-
bents increased; in certain regions, the governor’s influence has protected incum-
bents who are members of the family: the region of Oryol, for instance (Aidis and 
Adachi, 2007), Kursk (Kryshtanovskaya and White, 2005). The Expert criminal 
ranking is regarded as a good proxy for the level of corruption and the institution-
al failure in general. Accordingly, we will estimate the coefficient of this variable 
together with the court-related variables. These five variables are called “institu-
tional variables” hereinafter.
To assess possible impact of the politico-economic crises on firm entry and 
exit, we adopted four variables according to the discussion in Section 2. They 
comprise: a natural logarithm of world oil price, total trade volume as percent-
age of gross regional products (GRP), inflow of FDI in % of GRP, as well as 
a natural logarithm of direct distance between Brussels and the capital cities of 
Russian regions. As suggested in Kuboniwa (2014), the world oil price is ex-
tremely volatile against a global crisis and greatly influences the economic and 
business circumstances in Russia. Hence, we expect that the world oil price effec-
tively captures macro-economic shocks of the recent crises on the whole Russian 
economy. A crisis may affect Russian firms and entrepreneurs through shrinking 
of international trade and FDI. The total trade and FDI in percent of GRP are used 
to grasp these indirect effects of a crisis. The distance of Brussels and a regional 
capital is employed as a proxy for the geographical proximity of Russian regions 
to the EU. We assume that if other conditions are equal, Russian regions located 
near to the EU market tend to be negatively affected by a crisis much stronger 
than other regions. We call these four variables as “economic integration vari-
ables” hereinafter.
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In the regression estimation, we will also control for a series of factors that 
represent medium-term economic development, financial constraints, quality of 
social infrastructure, degree of inter-firm competition, market density as well as 
natural obstacles for business. The medium-term economic development is ex-
pressed by the GRP growth rate. The financial constraint is measured by a natural 
logarithm of number of credit organizations and their branches per 100,000 resi-
dents, which is considered as one of major barriers to both starting up and expan-
sion of businesses in Russia (Puffer and McCarthy, 2001; Pissarides et al., 2003). 
The quality of social infrastructure is proxied by a natural logarithm of number 
of PCs with internet connection per 100 workers, taking into account the fact that 
the information technology plays an important role in the contemporary Russian 
business. A natural logarithm of firms and organizations per 10,000 residents and 
population density are utilized to capture the effect of interfirm competition and 
market density, respectively. We expect that the former factor is negatively as-
sociated with firm entry and positively related to firm exit. On the other hand, we 
predict that the latter factor has a promoting effect of firm entry and exit. Average 
temperature in January serves as a proxy for natural obstacles for business, as-
suming that more severe climate conditions force Russian firms and entrepreneurs 
to take higher initial sunk costs that may restrict firm entry and exit (Iwasaki and 
Suganuma, 2005). In addition to the above six factors, we will also control for 
the time trend and district-level fixed effects, which, according to Figs. 1 and 2, 
may have a statistically significant impact both on firm entry and exit.
With regard to the time-variant variables, to avoid possible endogeneity with 
the dependent variables, a lagged three year moving average is utilized except for 
the world oil price, which is obviously exogenous for the overwhelming major-
ity of Russian firms and entrepreneurs. The definition, descriptive statistics, and 
source of the aforesaid variables are described in Table 2.
4.2. Estimation results
Tables 3 and 4 show the estimation results of firm entry and exit models, re-
spectively. To obtain coefficients of the time-invariant variables, we carry out 
a regression analysis by using a pooling OLS and a random-effects estimators and 
report one of these two estimation results according to the Breusch–Pagan test 
of the null-hypothesis that the variance of regional individual effects is zero. In 
both tables, Models [1] to [4] represent this kind of estimation results. In addition, 
to check statistical robustness of the time-variant variables, we also estimated 
a fixed-effect model and reported its result as Model [5].
With respect to the institutional variables, Table 3 shows that the acceptance 
rate of petition by regional arbitration courts and the lawsuits application number 
to regional arbitration courts are negatively related to firm entry with a statistical 
significance at the 10% and 1% level, respectively, in line with our prediction. In 
the same table, the Expert criminal ranking is insignificant as well as the mean and 
median duration of a lawsuit at a regional arbitration court in the random-effects 
models [1] to [4]. But it is given a significant and negative estimate in the fixed- 
effects  model [5]. As shown in Table 4, four of the five institutional variables are 
significantly associated with firm exit and all their coefficients are negative, suggest-
ing that the destruction of Russian firms is closely linked with institutional failure.
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Table 3
Panel data estimation of firm entry model in Russian regions.
Dependent variable Log of firm entry
Estimation period 2008–2014
Target regions All regions
Estimator Random-
effects
Random-
effects
Random-
effects
Random-
effects
Fixed- 
effects
Model [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Institutional variables
Log of duration of a lawsuit at 
a regional arbitration court 
(mean) 
–0.1148
(–0.960)
Log of duration of a lawsuit at 
a regional arbitration court 
(median) 
–0.0227
(–0.120)
Acceptance rate of petition by 
regional arbitration courts 
(%)
–0.0184*
(–1.810)
Log of lawsuit application 
number to regional arbitration 
courts per 1,000 organization
–0.1705***
(–2.820)
Expert criminal risk ranking –0.0004 –0.0004 –0.0003 –0.0002 –0.0009*
(–0.800) (–0.800) (–0.610) (–0.460) (–1.790)
Economic integration variables
Log of world oil price 0.4424*** 0.4425*** 0.4161*** 0.4164*** 0.4217***
(14.850) (14.970) (13.360) (13.610) (14.530)
Total trade in % of GRP –0.0013 –0.0013 –0.0011 –0.0012 –0.0007
(–1.460) (–1.520) (–1.040) (–1.120) (–0.550)
FDI inflow in % of GRP –0.0015 –0.0016 –0.0014 –0.0016 –0.0012
(–0.740) (–0.780) (–0.620) (–0.680) (–0.450)
Log of direct distance from 
Brussels
0.1453 0.1187 0.1285 0.1299
(0.870) (0.690) (0.760) (0.840)
Control variables
GRP growth rate (%) 0.0137*** 0.0136*** 0.0122*** 0.0118*** 0.0104***
(6.900) (6.850) (4.450) (4.330) (4.280)
Log of number of 
credit organizations 
and their branches 
per 100,000 residents 
0.0478 0.0406 –0.1032 –0.0976 –0.1923*
(0.750) (0.620) (–1.530) (–1.530) (–1.690)
Log of number of PCs 
with internet connection 
per 100 workers
0.2361* 0.2307* 0.1647 0.1492 0.1369
(1.800) (1.730) (1.120) (1.040) (1.020)
Log of number of firms 
and organizations 
per 10,000 residents 
–0.3374*** –0.3517*** –0.2732** –0.3032** –0.7550
(–3.270) (–3.470) (–2.230) (–2.460) (–5.310)
Log of population density 0.0817*** 0.0764*** 0.0738*** 0.0556*** 0.1892
(4.320) (4.070) (5.070) (4.150) (0.280)
Average temperature in January 0.0024 0.0025 –0.0021 –0.0016 –0.0030
(0.820) (0.870) (–0.620) (–0.500) (–0.850)
Time trend dummy –0.0766*** –0.0759*** –0.0718*** –0.0686*** –0.0702***
(–3.280) (–3.210) (–2.710) (–2.640) (–2.700)
Constant term 3.0643** 2.9831** 4.5010** 4.0051*** 6.2841***
(2.290) (2.230) (2.360) (2.750) (3.370)
Control for district-level  
fixed-effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Control for individual effects 
of regions
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(continued on next page)
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Table 4
Panel data estimation of firm exit model in Russian regions.
Dependent variable Log of firm exit
Estimation period 2008–2014
Target regions All regions
Estimator Random-
effects
Random-
effects
Random-
effects
Random-
effects
Fixed- 
effects
Model [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Institutional variables
Log of duration of a lawsuit 
at a regional arbitration 
court (mean) 
–0.4439**
(–2.370)
Log of duration of a lawsuit 
at a regional arbitration 
court (median) 
–0.6972***
(–3.190)
Acceptance rate of petition 
by regional arbitration 
courts (%)
–0.0341**
(–2.180)
Log of lawsuit application 
number to regional 
arbitration courts 
per 1,000 organization
0.1286
(1.250)
Expert criminal risk ranking –0.0025** –0.0023** –0.0023** –0.0019* –0.0018*
(–2.090) (–1.980) (–1.990) (–1.640) (–1.770)
Economic integration variables
Log of world oil price 0.6838*** 0.6796*** 0.7019*** 0.7029*** 0.6603***
(7.760) (7.790) (8.090) (8.190) (7.560)
Total trade in % of GRP –0.0037*** –0.0028*** –0.0035*** –0.0035*** –0.0035*
(–3.370) (–2.630) (–3.190) (–3.060) (–1.640)
FDI inflow in % of GRP 0.0117*** 0.0119*** 0.0082* 0.0095* 0.0104**
(2.740) (2.950) (1.640) (1.880) (2.090)
Log of direct distance from 
Brussels
–0.3021 –0.1465 –0.3574* –0.4942**
(–1.490) (–0.730) (–1.740) (–2.280)
Dependent variable Log of firm entry
Estimation period 2008–2014
Target regions All regions
Estimator Random-
effects
Random-
effects
Random-
effects
Random-
effects
Fixed- 
effects
Model [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
N 563 563 576 576 576 
R2 0.28 0.26 0.29 0.31 0.51 
Breusch–Pagan test a 481.18 *** 491.66 *** 422.07 *** 407.13 *** 430.93 ***
Hausman-test b – – – – 154.50 ***
Wald test / F-test (χ2) c 872.52 *** 881.37 *** 677.00 *** 598.94 *** 57.26 ***
Notes:
a Null hypothesis: The variance of regional individual effects are zero.
b Null hypothesis: Random-effects assumption is valid.
c Null hypothesis: All coefficients are zero.
Figures in parentheses beneath regression coefficients are t-statistics computed basing on robust standard errors. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Source: Authors’ estimation. See Table 2 for the definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables used in 
the estimation. 
Table 3 (continued)
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With regard to the economic integration variables, the world oil price dis-
plays a remarkably robust estimate in the firm entry model. In fact, as reported 
in Table 3, this variable is estimated at 1% significance level with a positive sign 
in all the five models, irrespective of the difference in model specification and 
estimator. In contrast, estimates of the other economic integration variables sug-
gest that regional dependence on international trade and direct investment from 
abroad and geographical proximity to the EU do not significantly affect the deci-
sion-making of Russian entrepreneurs who consider new entry to the market. On 
the other hand, the estimation results in Table 4 demonstrate that the destiny of 
Dependent variable Log of firm exit
Estimation period 2008–2014
Target regions All regions
Estimator Random-
effects
Random-
effects
Random-
effects
Random-
effects
Fixed- 
effects
Model [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Control variables
GRP growth rate (%) –0.0288*** –0.0294*** –0.0307*** –0.0302*** –0.0274***
(–5.030) (–5.040) (–5.560) (–5.660) (–4.390)
Log of number of 
credit organizations 
and their branches 
per 100,000 residents 
0.0719 0.0821 –0.0662 –0.0452 0.1927
(0.590) (0.710) (–0.550) (–0.360) (1.270)
Log of number of PCs with 
internet connection 
per 100 workers
–0.2784* –0.2533 –0.2187 –0.2312 –0.1517
(–1.770) (–1.540) (–1.350) (–1.450) (–0.970)
Log of number of firms 
and organizations 
per 10,000 residents 
0.3455** 0.3395** 0.2623* 0.3067* 0.3301
(2.240) (2.270) (1.840) (1.840) (0.570)
Log of population density 0.0695*** 0.0675*** 0.0526** 0.0499** 2.0269
(3.190) (3.300) (2.390) (2.140) (1.300)
Average temperature 
in January
–0.0265*** –0.0269*** –0.0259*** –0.0253*** –0.0456***
(–4.080) (–4.340) (–3.720) (–3.690) (–4.840)
Time trend dummy 0.0937*** 0.0897*** 0.0771** 0.0811** 0.0742**
(2.720) (2.580) (2.130) (2.250) (1.970)
Constant term 3.3873** 3.0776* 5.6176** 2.4230 –6.6001
(1.990) (1.790) (2.410) (1.370) (–1.050)
Control for district-level  
fixed-effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Control for individual effects 
of regions
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 562 562 575 575 575 
R2 0.43 0.44 0.42 0.41 0.46 
Breusch–Pagan test a 49.88 *** 39.46 *** 42.14 *** 48.34 *** 53.04 ***
Hausman-test b – – – – 32.37 ***
Wald test / F-test (χ2) c 557.34 *** 538.54 *** 531.72 *** 511.81 *** 42.58 ***
Notes:
a Null hypothesis: The variance of regional individual effects are zero.
b Null hypothesis: Random-effects assumption is valid.
c Null hypothesis: All coefficients are zero.
Figures in parentheses beneath regression coefficients are t-statistics computed basing on robust standard errors. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Source: Authors’ estimation. See Table 2 for the definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables used in 
the estimation. 
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Russian firms is nowadays deeply connected with the world economic dynamism. 
Indeed, not only the world oil price but also the other four economic integration 
variables are estimated with a significant coefficient, implying that the 2008 finan-
cial shock and subsequent crises greatly damaged Russian businesses as witnessed 
by Iwasaki (2014) in the case of large and medium-sized industrial companies and 
by Sprenger (2014) in the case of former socialist enterprises.
Many estimates of the control variables are significant, which corresponds to 
our predictions: medium-term economic growth encourages firm creation and, at 
the same time, keeps existing organizations alive. Intensive inter-firm competi-
tion blocks new comers and evicts poorly performing companies from the mar-
ket. High market density is a key promoting factor for both firm entry and exit. 
In regions with hard climate conditions, firms tend to stay in the market probably 
due to high initial sunk costs.
As a next step, we addressed the issue of heterogeneity of Russian regions. It 
is argued that Russia is a huge country and hence there exists a great variation 
among regions in terms of the socio-economic systems as well as the market/
industrial structure. To examine possible influence of regional heterogeneity, we 
re-estimated Model [4] in Table 3 and Model [2] in Table 4 by dividing observa-
tions into four subsample groups taking historical and geographical similarities 
of the federal districts into consideration.
The results are reported in Table 5. The statistical significance of the key vari-
ables is remarkably different between the subsamples, implying that the sys-
tem of firm creation and destruction is indeed manifold across Russian regions. 
The world oil price, however, takes a significant and positive coefficient in all 
the eight models corresponding to the above estimation results. The surprisingly 
robust estimate of the world oil price suggests the possibility that every Russian 
region is extremely sensitive to a global crisis and, accordingly, the regeneration 
of Russian firms was greatly damaged during the recent period.
4.3. Robustness check
In the previous subsection we mainly utilized a random-effects model to obtain 
estimates of the time-invariant variables and checked the statistical robustness 
of the time-variant variables by estimating a fixed-effects model. As additional 
robustness check, we also conducted the estimation using a population-average 
estimator, a between-effects estimator, a Hausman–Tylor estimator and a system 
GMM estimator, and found no remarkable differences from the estimation results 
reported in Tables 3, 4, and 5.4
Furthermore, we also carried out a supplementary estimation, in which vari-
ous sample restrictions were placed on the regression models and confirmed that 
these sample restrictions do not substantially change our major empirical find-
ings. More specifically, supplementary regressions were conducted with the fol-
lowing five settings: (a) excluding Moscow and St. Petersburg, which are under 
direct control of the Federal government (i.e., federal cities), from observations; 
(b) excluding so-called “resource-rich” regions from observations; (c) dividing 
 4 The Hausman–Tylor and system GMM estimations were attempted to estimate and endogenize non-lagged 
time-variant independent variables.
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Table 5
Examination of heterogeneity among Russian regions
(a) Firm entry
Dependent variable Log of firm entry
Estimation period 2008–2014
Target regions North 
Caucasus and 
Southern 
Districts
Central and 
Northwestern 
Districts
Volga 
and Ural 
Districts
Siberian 
and Far East 
Districts
Estimator Pooling  
OLS
Random- 
effects
Random- 
effects
Random- 
effects
Model [1] [2] [3] [4]
Institutional variables
Log of lawsuit application 
number to regional arbitration 
courts per 1,000 organization
0.0360 –0.2088** –0.0954 –0.2357***
(0.330) (–1.990) (–0.530) (–3.730)
Expert criminal risk ranking 0.0028 –0.0002 –0.0001 –0.00037
(1.160) (–0.250) (–0.150) (–0.610)
Economic integration variables
Log of world oil price 0.5613*** 0.4811*** 0.4131*** 0.3730***
(4.400) (9.000) (9.670) (6.490)
Total trade in % of GRP –0.0051** 0.0001 0.0032 0.0000
(–2.470) (0.060) (1.210) (–0.040)
FDI inflow in % of GRP –0.0307 –0.0048 –0.0070 0.0001
(–1.050) (–0.960) (–1.280) (0.070)
Log of direct distance from 
Brussels
–0.4690 0.6934*** –0.1648 0.1763
(–0.500) (3.230) (–0.270) (1.210)
Control variables
GRP growth rate (%) 0.0227* 0.0070** 0.0146*** 0.0095***
(1.740) (2.040) (3.760) (3.060)
Log of number of 
credit organizations 
and their branchs 
per 100,000 residents 
–0.0409 0.0298 0.1291 –0.1484***
(–0.610) (0.240) (0.930) (–2.820)
Log of number of PCs with 
internet connection 
per 100 workers
–0.0054 –0.1838* –0.0993 –0.0021
(–0.040) (–1.750) (–0.650) (–0.040)
Log of number of firms 
and organizations 
per 10,000 residents 
–0.1159 –0.1930 –0.1216 –0.1013
(–0.890) (–1.430) (–0.730) (–1.200)
Log of population density 0.2299*** 0.0703*** 0.0334 0.0660**
(3.730) (2.670) (0.720) (2.540)
Average temperature in January –0.0408*** 0.0179*** 0.0025 –0.0101***
(–2.770) (3.430) (0.750) (–2.820)
Time trend dummy –0.0233 0.0062 0.0027 –0.0563***
(–0.690) (0.290) (0.080) (–4.990)
Constant term 5.1432 –0.2498 5.2981 3.3762**
(0.680) (–0.120) (0.880) (2.130)
Control for district-level fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for individual effects 
of regions
No Yes Yes Yes
N 90 203 140 143 
R2 0.49 0.33 0.22 0.67 
Breusch–Pagan test a 0.00 206.42 *** 55.14 *** 26.41 ***
Wald test / F-test (χ2) b 6.48 *** 377.07 *** 2207.91 *** 1766.72 ***
(continued on next page)
187I. Iwasaki et al. / Russian Journal of Economics 2 (2016) 162−191
Dependent variable Log of firm exit
Estimation period 2008–2014
Target regions North 
Caucasus and 
Southern 
Districts
Central and 
Northwestern 
Districts
Volga 
and Ural 
Districts
Siberian 
and Far East 
Districts
Estimator Pooling  
OLS
Random- 
effects
Random- 
effects
Random- 
effects
Model [1] [2] [3] [4]
Institutional variables
Log of duration of a lawsuit at 
a regional arbitration court 
(median) 
–0.5783* –0.7549** –1.1080* –0.1469
(–1.670) (–2.250) (–1.770) (–0.470)
Expert criminal risk ranking –0.0049 –0.0039* –0.0059*** –0.0005
(–1.150) (–1.800) (–2.750) (–0.260)
Economic integration variables
Log of world oil price 0.8414** 0.4158*** 0.5878*** 0.7513***
(2.530) (3.230) (3.060) (4.310)
Total trade in % of GRP 0.0004 0.0008 –0.0097* –0.0052***
(0.060) (0.350) (–1.830) (–2.660)
FDI inflow in % of GRP 0.0061 –0.0055 0.0274* 0.0102***
(0.110) (–0.470) (1.660) (3.010)
Log of direct distance from Brussels 4.4697** –0.5696 1.7801* 0.0310
(2.160) (–1.110) (1.680) (0.080)
Control variables
GRP growth rate (%) –0.0413** –0.0397*** –0.0209 –0.0090
(–2.310) (–3.860) (–1.590) (–0.850)
Log of number of credit 
organizations and their branches 
per 100,000 residents 
–0.9893* 0.1923 0.7060*** 0.1871
(–1.870) (1.130) (2.930) (1.240)
Log of number of PCs with internet 
connection per 100 workers
0.8113** –0.4048* –0.8634*** –0.6831***
(2.160) (–1.850) (–2.930) (–5.490)
Log of number of firms and 
organizations per 10,000 residents 
0.9106** 0.0100 0.7951*** 0.4955***
(2.190) (0.050) (2.910) (3.770)
Log of population density 0.4113** 0.1487*** 0.2502*** 0.1045*
(2.510) (3.880) (2.920) (1.920)
Average temperature in January –0.0566** –0.0796*** –0.0276** –0.0118
(–2.010) (–5.550) (–2.040) (–1.140)
Time trend dummy –0.1791** 0.1133** 0.2206*** 0.1768***
(–2.190) (2.270) (3.450) (6.520)
Constant term –39.5232** 9.1650*** –13.0383* –2.0756
(–2.240) (2.620) (–1.760) (–0.520)
Control for district-level fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for individual effects of regions No Yes Yes No
N 84 196 140 142 
R2 0.58 0.52 0.50 0.48 
Breusch–Pagan test a 0.00 3.45 ** 1.84* 0.19 
Wald test / F-test (χ2) b 4.77 *** 369.94 *** 444.54 *** 10.09 ***
Notes:
a Null hypothesis: The variance of regional individual effects are zero.
b Null hypothesis: All coefficients are zero.
Figures in parentheses beneath regression coefficients are t-statistics computed basing on robust standard errors. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Source: Authors’ estimation. See Table 2 for the definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables used in 
the estimation.
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observations into those for the years of 2008–2011 and those for the years of 
2012–2014; (d) limiting regions to those with FDI in % of GRP within the mean 
±1 standard deviation; (e) limiting regions to those with total trade in % of GRP 
within the mean ±1 standard deviation.
The above findings led us to the judgment that the estimation results reported 
in this paper are robust across the various specifications, apart from the regional 
heterogeneity discussed in the previous subsection.
5. Conclusions
This paper is based upon a rich and unpublished panel dataset of regional-level 
data for the period 2008–2014. Our regression analysis gives a special attention to 
two aspects: institutional failures and the recent economic crises and downturns 
that characterize the period of investigation. More specifically, we take the natural 
logarithm of firm entry or exit rate as the dependent variable and focus on two ex-
planatory sets of variables: four proxies for the efficiency of the judiciary system 
which are provided by Dmitrieva et al. (2012) and the federal arbitration court, and 
variables that measure the extent to which Russian firms are integrated in the world 
economy: the natural logarithm of world oil price, total trade volume in percent of 
GRP, inflow of FDI in % of GRP and finally the natural logarithm of the distance 
between Brussels and the capital cities of Russian regions. 
The results lead us to the overall conclusion that the Russian economy func-
tions within a legal, institutional and political environment that hinders the com-
petition among firms, which is detrimental for economic development. On top of 
that, corruption and vested interests complicate furthermore the overall frame-
work where private companies are forced to operate. As a result, entry rates of 
new businesses are declining over the period of the analysis, while the number 
of firms leaving the market is increasing. This is the case, in spite of already low 
entry rates as compared to other transitional economies. 
More specifically, the entry and exit rates of businesses depend upon the effi-
ciency of the judiciary system in resolving disputes related to the non-compli-
ance with contracts and the non-payment of arrears. The resulting uncertainty 
and instability amplified by discretionary bureaucratic practices of public admin-
istrations distort dramatically the economic governance principles at all levels. 
In terms of entry/exit of businesses, this translates into a chaotic evolution of 
the two rates, with successive peaks and bottoms over the period. 
Two major external factors bring additional menaces to the already fragile 
economic conditions. Firstly, Russian firms, mainly SMEs, are highly sensitive 
to the variation of the world oil price, regardless of their geographical location 
and specialization. The oil price is the only variable pertaining to the integration 
of Russia in the world economy which is robustly related to firms’ entry and 
exit. Our findings have two policy implications, namely that the oil curse can be 
a blessing if the rent is not a source of widespread corruption and does not im-
pede the development of other sectors employing entrepreneurs and workers; and 
a rule of the law favorable to the emergence of a sound business environment is 
key to allow SMEs to enter/exit the market in a creative way. Russian economy, 
based essentially on oil and gas related activities, is therefore insufficiently diver-
sified to cope with the negative impact of falling prices of these natural resources. 
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No after-oil strategic perspectives of development exist, which will definitely 
have serious implications in the future. The second important external factor is 
related to the vulnerability of the economy to world crises. Although the degree 
of integration of Russian economy into the global economy is relatively low, 
the 2008 crisis did have impact on the entry and exit of Russian businesses. 
The internal and external factors damaging the economic performance influ-
ence the firm creation and destruction at national, regional and district levels. 
Specifically, the entries are declining as a consequence of those factors while 
exits are increasing, which leads to a low survival rate of enterprises. This ten-
dency is somehow attenuated in certain regions where the local governments are 
in political harmony with the central power, which grants them some privileges 
to cope with the adverse effects of exogenous influences. Overall, the impact of 
external threats on various regions vary according to the degree of vulnerability 
to outside crises, which in turn depends on the extent to which a particular region 
is more or less isolated from the source of the crisis.
To conclude, the firm creation and firm destruction in Russia is a multifarious 
process, in particular at regional level. As a general rule, the medium-term per-
spectives of economic growth encourages the entries of new businesses, as it is 
common to all countries. At the same time, those perspectives keep alive the ma-
jority of existing organizations. Strong inter-enterprise competition limits the entry 
of newcomers and evicts poorly performing companies from the market. High 
market density represents a major promoting factor both for entries and exits.
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